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125

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EASTERN EUROPEAN PROBLEMS

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USSR-East Germany The USSR is unlikely to use the recent East German elections and the increasing "sovereignty" being granted to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a pretext for concluding in the near future either a unilateral peace treaty or treaty of mutual assistance with the East German state. The USSR may, however, parallel Western action by declaring a termination to the state of war with Germany. Furthermore, in an attempt to increase the prestige of the GDR, it may remove overt Soviet controls from the East German economy and permit the Soviet diplomatic mission to the GDR to carry on the duties of the Soviet Control Commission. As the USSR will retain its overt status as an occupying power, it is likely that the USSR will limit the role of the "sovereign" GDR to minor harassment of the Western Powers.

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A unilateral peace treaty with the GDR would give the USSR no significant additional advantages, and would present the Kremlin with certain difficulties which it is under no compulsion to face at this time. A peace treaty would gain little support from the German people and would produce little propaganda advantage unless accompanied by the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces. In view of present international tension, the Western decision to increase occupation forces in Germany, and the probability of limited West German rearmament, it is not likely that the USSR is contemplating even a reduction in its occupation forces. Moreover, a separate peace would openly violate the Potsdam Agreement and weaken considerably a basic Soviet propaganda contention that the division of Germany is the result of Western violations of the Potsdam Agreement. Finally, the USSR may not desire at this time to erect a legal barrier to future four-power consideration of the German problem.


- 5 -

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With regard to a mutual assistance pact, the current preponderance of Soviet military strength makes such a pact unnecessary at this time. Moreover, the Kremlin probably wishes to avoid a formal military commitment because of its realization that the struggle for Germany will always entail a grave risk of global war.

Bulgarian Provocations The continuing and deliberate acts of provocation initiated by Bulgaria against Greece and Turkey, as well as Yugoslavia, not only demonstrate the Kremlin's policy of using its Satellites to create tension and unrest but also point up Soviet ability to pursue mutually contradictory tactics. Bulgaria has recently added to its routine propaganda attacks, diplomatic pressure, and minor border incidents, a demand that Turkey repatriate immediately 250,000 Bulgarians of Turkish ancestry and an attempt to seize a small piece of Greek territory along the border by changing the course of the Evros River. Aside from the advantages of inciting unrest, obstructing the Turkish and Greek economies, and creating a pretext for possible aggression, it is difficult to see what profit the USSR expects to gain from these provocative acts. They are patently inconsistent with the Soviet peace campaign and serve to lessen any effect it might have in Greece and Turkey. Moreover, by arousing Greek and Turkish nationalist feeling, these acts tend to increase Greek and Turkish popular resentment against the Communist movement.



- 6 -

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